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CALABRESI AND THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS
KEITH N. HYLTON*
ABSTRACT
This Essay traces the vein of thought represented by Calabresi's
The Costs of Accidents, both backward in time to examine its
sources, and forward to its impact on current scholarship. Ifocus on
three broad topics: positive versus normative law and economics, pos-
itivist versus anti-positivist thinking in law, and the assumption of
rationality in law and economics.
No lecture on the history of thought in law and economics would be
complete without some discussion of Guido Calabresi's The Costs of
Accidents.1 The book has had an enormous influence on the field. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that modern law and economics,
as we see it practiced today, had its start with Gary Becker's article on
crime 2 and Guido Calabresi's book, both products of the late 1960s.3
In this Essay I want to identify and trace the vein of thought rep-
resented by Calabresi's book, both backward in time to examine its
sources, and forward to its impact on current scholarship. I will focus
on three broad topics: positive versus normative work in law and eco-
nomics; positivist versus anti-positivist thinking in law, and especially
law and economics; and, lastly, the assumption of rationality in the
economic analysis of law. Before tackling these topics, I will start with
an effort to locate Calabresi's book within the history of economic
analysis of law.
* Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School of
Law. Prepared for Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law and
Scholarship, a Symposium honoring Guido Calabresi, at the University of Maryland School
of Law, April 23 & 24, 2004. I thank Bob Bone, Peter Carstensen, Steve Medema, Andrei
Shleifer, and David Walker for helpful comments.
1. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
3. The near simultaneous appearance of Becker's article and Calabresi's book may
reflect broader changes in public policy views during the 1960s. For a discussion of the
changes in perspective among American lawyers during the 1960s, and likely influences on
the law, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
I. A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS
Law and economics views law from an instrumentalist perspec-
tive. That is a perspective that seeks to determine the function of law
and the manner in which it solves the social problems thrown before
it. Bentham is the most obvious source that comes to mind for this
approach. Bentham's core contribution to legal theory was a rejec-
tion of the view that law should be understood as emanating from or
growing out of some set of a priori fundamental rights.4 Blackstone
had led students to think of the law in this way, and Bentham, as one
of those students, seemed to have staked his career on overturning
this view.5 He succeeded; though Blackstone was a more complicated
thinker than Bentham's early caricature suggests.
Blackstone himself incorporated instrumentalist reasoning in
parts of his Commentaries.6 His volume on criminal law both refers to
and shows the influence of Beccaria's utilitarian writing on punish-
ment.7 Taking the sum of his views as a theorist, Blackstone presents a
muddled picture. He comes across as utilitarian in his treatment of
criminal law, and a promoter of nonconsequentialist, fundamental-
rights theory in other parts of the Commentaries; especially when he
discusses the most basic protections provided by the common law-of
life, liberty, and property.8
As I have suggested, the instrumentalist or functionalist approach
to law typically identified with Bentham makes some appearances in
the theoretical literature that predates Bentham. The case of Beccaria
I have already mentioned. Beccaria's theory that punishment should
be set at a level that wipes out the expected gains of the criminal ac-
tor, and not above that level, formed the basis of his influential cri-
tique of criminal law enforcement published in 1764.' Beccaria's
4. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35-44 (photo. reprint 1979)
(Charles Warren Everett ed., 1928), (1776) [hereinafter A COMMENT ON THE
COMMENTARIES].
5. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 32-33 (1983) [hereinafter
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].
6. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 14-19 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1769) (discussing the deterrence value of criminal punishment).
7. See, e.g., 4 id. at 17 (describing Beccaria's "ingenious" writing on punishment).
8. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 117-41 (discussing the "absolute rights of
individuals"). Another reason Blackstone's perspective as a theorist is unclear is that he
shows influences from Hobbes in parts of his discussion. His perspective may be closer to
utilitarian than is commonly recognized.
9. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 62-64 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g 1978) (1764).
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critique served as the chief source of theoretical insights for Black-
stone's treatment of criminal law, and also likely served as the chief
inspiration for Bentham's work on criminal law.' ° While Blackstone
provided a negative inspiration for Bentham, a figure that Bentham
would caricature, ridicule, and hold up as an example of all that is
wrong with legal theory, 1 Beccaria provided a positive inspiration.
Almost at the same time as Beccaria was writing, Adam Smith
gave lectures on jurisprudence to a class at Glasgow University. 2
Smith's lectures, seldom discussed in the law and economics litera-
ture, provide really the first sustained treatment of law from an eco-
nomic perspective. Smith provides especially detailed discussions of
property and criminal law.' 3 His lectures on criminal law, anticipating
Becker, argue that criminal penalties tend to be inversely related to
the probability of detection. 4 Smith's work has never received the
attention showered on Bentham, which I find puzzling.
Immediately before Beccaria and Smith, one finds Hume's dis-
cussion of property and norms, which treats property law as the result
of an implicit contract that develops over time within a society.
1 5
While Hume influenced Smith, he appears not to have influenced
Bentham. Before Hume, one finds Hobbes's discussion of the com-
mon law. Hobbes argued that the king should have a strong hand in
interpreting the law, and, more importantly, suggested that the law's
purpose is to maximize social welfare.' 6
Although Bentham is generally viewed as the source of instru-
mentalism in legal theory, I think the starting point is Hobbes. For at
the core of instrumentalism is a notion that the law's purpose should
be understood from the perspective of what an economist would call a
social planner or what a philosopher might call a Platonic philoso-
pher-king. Hobbes is probably the fundamental source for the argu-
ment that law should not be understood or justified only on its own
terms, or, equivalently, rejecting the notion that law can only be under-
10. 11 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 575-78 (Methuen & Co. and
Sweet & Maxwell 1966) (1938).
11. See generally BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES , supra note 4. For an
illuminating discussion of Bentham and Blackstone, see POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 5, at 13-47.
12. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1978) (1762-66).
13. See, e.g., id at 13-86 (on property); 105-40 (on criminal law).
14. E.g., id. at 129.
15. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-516 (Prometheus Books 1992)
(1739).
16. THOMAS HOBBES, A DLLOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COM-
MON LAWS OF ENGLAND 57-71 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1681).
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stood or justified by a lawyer steeped in the intricacies of legal opin-
ions and terminology. Law and economics practitioners make this
argument frequently today; the first wave of legal realists, including
Holmes, made the argument several generations ago. 7 Bentham pre-
ceded the realists by roughly one hundred years. All of them are
partly in debt to Hobbes.
I am not suggesting that Bentham is not the key or most impor-
tant source for instrumentalism. He clearly is, especially for the law
and economics school. However, being the most important source is
not the same thing as being the starting point. The starting point for
instrumentalism in law is the notion of detachment that the law should
be justifiable to a detached spectator who is not committed to main-
taining some set of perceived logical connections among various legal
doctrines. Once that notion is accepted, we have the groundwork set
for all instrumentalist theories of law. And note that Kantian argu-
ments are in essence instrumentalist,"8 as are utilitarian arguments.
Now let's move back up to Bentham, in whose work we see a pur-
posive and goal-oriented marriage of instrumentalism and utilitarian-
ism, and consider the development of law and economics from this
point. After Bentham, roughly one hundred years passed before
Holmes wrote The Common Law,19 presenting a largely utilitarian justi-
fication for the law. But there are big differences from Bentham's
approach. Holmes backs away from the detachment of Hobbes and
Bentham: he wants us to understand the law and its internal logic.
Holmes backs away from the role of independent critic or censor. He
sets out to justify the law as it is.
Following Holmes, we find another long dry spell up to the
roughly simultaneous publications of Calabresi's Costs and Becker's ar-
ticle on crime.20 There are interesting similarities between the two
works. Both Becker and Calabresi step comfortably into the role of
17. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
18. See, e.g., George Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 CoLUsM. L. REv.
533 (1987).
19. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
20. I refer to this period as a dry spell only because there does not appear to be any-
thing as ambitious in scope as we see at the endpoints (Holmes on one end, Calabresi on
the other). However, there were novel and important contributions to law and economics
over this period. The best known is that of Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (setting out the "Coase Theorem," which holds that if
transaction costs are low, individuals will bargain their way to an efficient arrangement,
whatever the liability rule). While the Coase Theorem has become perhaps the key start-
ing point for any economic analysis of law, I have not focused on it here because it is not
associated with a broad school of thought in law and economics. The best known are those
of Aaron Director, probably the founder of Chicago School antitrust analysis, and Ward
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detachment, following the tradition of Hobbes and Bentham. Neither
thinks it is important for his reader to understand the law from the
perspective of a specialist in the common law. This is obviously natu-
ral for Becker, since he had no training as a lawyer. For Calabresi,
Hobbesian detachment is a bit tougher to explain. After all, this is an
individual who had distinguished himself as one of the best-trained
lawyers of his generation. Yet, there we find him in Costs, proceeding
as if the law were of secondary importance at best.
Indeed, one could describe the personality reflected in Cala-
bresi's Costs as one of hyper-detachment. The book describes itself as
a "legal and economic analysis,"2" which it most assuredly is. But Cala-
bresi takes a position of detachment from both the law and the eco-
nomics. He prefaces his economic remarks in several parts of the
book with comments such as "an economist would say,"2 2 to remind us
that he does not necessarily agree with them. He tells us early on that
economics is good for solving certain problems, but not all problems,
especially those involving basic questions of identity or morality.23 In
spite of this, he conducts an economic analysis that appears to be on
the highest level of sophistication that one could imagine for the topic
at hand. And as Frank Michelman noted in his review, Calabresi
shows a far greater awareness of the machinery of law and govern-
ment, and the limits of human rationality, than even the best econo-
mists would have brought to the task.2 4
Calabresi's book and Becker's article are thoroughly in the tradi-
tion of Bentham. Like Bentham, both Calabresi and Becker apply
utilitarianism in an effort to promote sweeping reforms of vast areas of
the law. In Calabresi's case, his ultimate goal is to replace the "fault
system" (or negligence regime) of tort law with a "mixed system" that
relies heavily on strict liability for injury-causing activities. 25 Becker,
on the other hand, aims to change the goal of criminal punishment
from completely deterring criminal acts to internalizing costs to of-
fenders.26 Both reforms are so ambitious that neither author seriously
could have expected to see them implemented within his lifetime.
Bowman. The institutional and labor economics of John R. Commons is another impor-
tant contribution.
21. Calabresi subtitled his book A Legal and Economic Analysis. THE COSTS OF Acci-
DENTS, supra note 1.
22. See, e.g., id. at 72 (discussing optimal pricing based on social cost).
23. Id. at 18-20.
24. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 647-48 (1971) (book review).
25. THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 311-18.
26. Becker, supra note 2, at 207-09.
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Also like Bentham, the reforms suggested by Calabresi and
Becker would have the effect of undermining established law in their
chosen research areas, to the point of making it irrelevant. Calabresi's
approach is most clearly similar to Bentham's, as his reforms would
have required a shift from the negligence rule and all of the compli-
cated law that has grown out of it. Calabresi's approach would have
replaced the core of tort doctrine with simpler, more direct liability
rules that, on a statistical basis, would have loaded liability on the most
appropriate actors (the cheapest cost avoiders)27 Becker's approach
would have resulted in a Bentham-like revolution in an indirect man-
ner. By changing the system of penalties to ones based on cost-inter-
nalization, it would no longer be necessary under Becker's regime to
know whether you had violated the law. If we could calculate the ex-
ternal costs of your actions accurately, we could impose those costs on
you, and the law, whatever it says, would eventually whither away-like
law under Marxism.
The next development following Calabresi and Becker was the
publication of the first edition of Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law.28 Just as Holmes bought into utilitarianism but rejected the re-
form efforts of Bentham, Posner bought into economic analysis and
rejected the reform efforts of Calabresi and Becker. Like Holmes,
Posner defended the law as it is. However, Posner is much more ex-
plicit in his adoption of economic theory than Holmes. Posner claims
that the common law aims to maximize wealth.2" Wealth maximiza-
tion is distinguishable from utilitarianism, largely in the sense that
wealth maximization makes no effort to take into account differences
in individual preferences, except in so far as those differences are ex-
pressed in the market through prices. Wealth maximization, as an
objective, yields a result that is probably identical to that of Adam
Smith's impartial spectator, who also made no effort to take into ac-
count differences in individual preferences when he decided whether
some allocation was appropriate. 30 Holmes, on the other hand, was
writing at a stage when there was far less scientific capital to use in his
own work, and speaking to a somewhat different audience. In addi-
tion, he appears to be more of a utilitarian, and more Hobbesian, in
27. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 312.
28. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, 1st ed.].
29. E.g., id. at 98-102.
30. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 12, at 17-18 (describing the perspective of the impartial
spectator).
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the sense that he believes that laws, real laws, must be "living and
armed,"'" or backed up by the preferences of a forceful group.3 2
Since the purpose of this Essay is to examine the contributions of
Calabresi's book to law and economics, I will not continue to go for-
ward tracing the general development of law and economics. I have
said enough here in my effort to locate Calabresi's work within the
broad current of thought in law and economics. I will turn now to
consider some of the tensions between Calabresi's approach and alter-
natives that have developed along the way.
II. POSITVE VERSUS NORMATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
Students of economics are familiar with the distinction between
positive economics and normative economics. Positive economics seeks
merely to explain institutions or conventions that exist. Normative
economics seeks to tell us how institutions or conventions should be
designed. The same distinction applies to law and economics. Posi-
tive law and economics seeks to explain the law, or the legal system, as
it is. Normative law and economics seeks to describe how the law or
the legal system should be.
Calabresi's Costs, with its criticism of the negligence regime and
argument that it should be replaced by simpler rules based on strict
liability, is clearly in the normative category. Calabresi's approach
puts him firmly in the camp of Bentham, who wanted to scrap the
common law and replace it with a simpler set of rules that would be
easier to follow and lead to more predictable outcomes.3" Indeed,
normative law and economics begins more or less with Bentham, and
then has its next most significant advance in Calabresi's Costs. Proba-
bly the majority of modern articles on law and economics are norma-
tive analyses, especially among the pieces based on mathematical
modeling.3 4
Positive law and economics, on the other hand, arguably begins
with Adam Smith's lectures, though they appear to have had no clear
influence on anyone. Although one can find instances in which schol-
ars have rediscovered points discussed in Smith-e.g., the notion that
31. HOBBES, supra note 16, at 59 (arguing that real laws are "living and armed," and
therefore distinguishable from the laws of reason promoted by the philosopher).
32. Eg., Holmes, supra note 17, at 464-66.
33. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 147-336
(1986) (exploring Bentham's critique of the common law and his proposal to replace it).
34. E.g., Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, 4
AM. LAw & ECON. REV. 18 (2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:
An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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an efficient system would impose higher penalties when the
probability of detection is low; or the notion, stressed by Holmes, that
the criminal law has its roots in vengeance 3 5-it is quite difficult to
find citations to Smith's lectures. The next step along the positive
path, roughly one hundred years after Smith, is Holmes's The Common
Law. That is followed, again by another one hundred years, by Pos-
ner's Economic Analysis of Law. Today, positive economic analysis of
law continues to be published, 6 though it seems to be less attractive
to scholars than normative analysis.
A normative economic analysis typically begins with the deriva-
tion and specification of an objective function, which the analyst then
argues is optimized by his particular policy prescription. In Cala-
bresi's analysis, he describes the objective function as the sum of the
injury and avoidance costs associated with accidents (primary costs),
risk-spreading costs (secondary costs), and administrative costs (terti-
ary costs)." This description of the tort system's objective is now the
standard approach to evaluating the operational efficiency of the tort
system. The core of Calabresi's argument for reform is that a system
of strict liability rules, directed at the appropriate activities, comes
much closer to minimizing the sum of primary, secondary, and terti-
ary costs than does the fault system.38
In view of the greater popularity of normative law and economics
among today's scholars, Calabresi's Costs has been a success in terms
of inspiring the work of generations that followed. In addition to the
inspiration provided by Calabresi, the reasons for this success are sev-
eral. First, normative law and economics does not require a huge in-
vestment in learning the details of legal doctrine. Thus, a normative
scholar should find it easier to work across disciplines and to gain the
interest of scholars in other disciplines. Second, given the view in
most law faculties that economics is a conservative mode of thought,39
normative work may appear especially attractive to law professors who
do not specialize in economics (i.e., the majority of law professors)
and to law students as well.
The question lurking beneath this is whether the relative advan-
tage enjoyed by normative law and economics is a desirable result. Is
it a good thing for legal scholarship, or scholarship in general, that
35. HOLMES, supra note 19, at 2-5.
36. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 6th ed.].
37. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 26-31.
38. Id. at 312.
39. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 6th ed., supra note 36, at 27.
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the Bentham-Calabresi line of law and economics scholarship is now
more popular than the Smith-Holmes-Posner line?
I think there is a case to be made that it is not a good thing, and
that law and economics scholarship and legal scholarship generally
will suffer in the long term as a result. The case begins with the view
espoused by Karl Popper and Milton Friedman on the relative value of
positive analysis in economics.4 ° The Popper-Friedman argument is
that economic analysis is most valuable when it is helping us solve ex-
isting puzzles, to understand institutions or conventions that exist,
and less valuable when used to design new institutions.41
The argument behind the Popper-Friedman position is as follows.
When we approach complicated social institutions or conventions,
like the law, we are looking at a system that has evolved over time, and
has along the way adapted to constraints and solved problems. The
analyst often cannot easily discover the information that is embodied
within the system's design. Economic analysis, however, can be quite
useful in this discovery process. In a similar fashion, normative analy-
sis that attempts to redesign a social system from scratch-for exam-
ple, redesigning the law of torts-is at a disadvantage for the same
reason; the analyst may not understand all of the information embod-
ied in the existing system.
This argument applies to economic analysis of law. Indeed, the
argument applies most strongly here, if it applies anywhere. If there is
any validity at all to the Popper-Friedman view, that validity must
surely be observed in the case of the legal system, and particularly the
common law. The common law is a system that has evolved-a
"grown order" in Hayek's terms42 -responding at various times to
constraints that may no longer be obvious. With such systems, the
analyst with a reformist agenda should show some humility.
The proper degree of humility, however, is generally lacking in
normative economic analysis of law. To be sure, thoughtful analysts
show awareness of the limitations of their own analysis. Calabresi, for
example, acknowledges the limitations of his analysis and constantly
40. 2 KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 95-96 (5th ed. 1966); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 5-7 (1953).
41. See POPPER, supra note 40, at 95-96 (asserting that the main goal of social science is
to analyze human reactions within the context of current institutions); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 40, at 4-7 (describing positive economic analysis as that which explains "what is" and
not "what ought to be").
42. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY- RULES AND ORDER 35 (1973).
MARYI.AND LAW REVIEW
questions and reexamines his own arguments in Costs.43 But the self-
doubt one observes in Calabresi's book is rarely found in normative
analyses today.
Even when doubts are expressed openly, there is no getting
around the problem of uncertainty and limited knowledge. The nor-
mative law and economics approach, from Bentham to Calabresi to
modern analysts, reflects at bottom an arrogant belief in the power of
theory to provide useful policies for reforming complicated institu-
tions. And law certainly qualifies as a complicated social institution.
This may seem to be an excessively harsh assessment. However, what
should one say about the implicit assumption underlying a substantial
part of the normative project, when an analyst claims to have found a
reform that solves a complicated systemic problem that has bedeviled
countless individuals participating in the system for many years, many
of whom are quite as thoughtful as the normative analyst?
As a contributor to the normative law and economics literature
(with a personal stake in its success), I realize that this critique should
not be taken too far. At its extreme, it is defeatist in its suggestion that
there is no point in applying normative economic analysis to law. The
critique seems to say that if there is a neat solution to a problem in the
legal system, then you should not trouble yourself with proposing it,
because if it were really such a neat solution someone would have dis-
covered it long before you.
I do not wish to convey that message. However, I do think it is
important for law and economics analysts to consider the possibility
that there is more normative analysis in the literature today than war-
ranted by its value relative to positive analysis. The common law is full
of puzzles in the form of doctrines whose functions are generally not
understood. Economic analysis of law, at least to the Popper-Fried-
man sympathizers, serves its most useful purpose when it is helping us
solve those puzzles. It seems improper, in any event, to surge ahead
with one normative analysis after another before even attempting to
apply economics to gain a better understanding of the common law as
it is. If positive analysis is useful in discovering the information hid-
den in a social institution, such as the law, then analysts should try to
uncover that information before proposing legislative reforms.
43. E.g., THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 14-15; see also Michelman, supra note
24, at 648 (describing Calabresi's book as a "trove of arguments, rejoinders, perspectives,
[and] considerations").
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III. POSITIVISTS VERSUS ANTI-POSITIVISTS
While the term positive analysis refers to efforts to use economics
to explain institutions, the term positivism, to lawyers, refers to the view
that the only laws that exist are those in the statute books or likely to
be enforced by the state. An anti-positivist would argue that laws also
include norms or conventions that people respect, even if they are not
in a law book anywhere or the state is unlikely to enforce them. One
version of anti-positivism is the classical common-law theory of Black-
stone, which views the law as resulting from the norms of reasonable
conduct adopted within society.44
Anti-positivism has not fared well in the law and economics litera-
ture. Hume is the first to bring this approach to the economic analy-
sis of law.45 Hume argued that we determine through long
experience that certain acts are harmful to social welfare, and society
develops norms discouraging those acts.46 Over time, those norms be-
come publicly asserted as law.47 Somewhat later, Hayek argued that
the law evolves from norms that develop through social intercourse.48
Bruno Leoni extended this line of reasoning to provide one of the
early arguments for the economic efficiency of the common law.49
Calabresi does not take a clear position on the positivism versus
anti-positivism debate. However, because his approach is so similar to
Bentham's, it is implicitly positivist. The most basic component of
that approach is what I have referred to as detachment, the notion
that one does not feel a need to study or explain the law in great
detail in order to evaluate it. While one can be detached in this sense,
and not positivist, it seems to me that one must be a positivist if he is
detached. The reason is that if the detached analyst does not need to
explain or work through the legal doctrines carefully in order to
reach an assessment of the law, he will perceive no need to study
norms as generators of legal doctrine. Hence, the detached analyst is
never an anti-positivist as I have defined the term. On the other hand,
if the analyst is evaluating the law, he must have some minimal sense
of what it consists of, which would seem to require a positivist's con-
ception of law.
I doubt that any anti-positivist, or believer in norms as important
sources of law, could ever be detached in the sense of Bentham and
44. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 63-92.
45. HUME, supra note 15, 484-501.
46. Id.
47. Id,
48. 1 HAYEK, supra note 42, at 35-54.
49. BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 58-94 (3d ed. 1991).
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Calabresi. If you believe that norms are an important source-let's
say, the most important source-of common law, then you probably
also think that those norms develop over time through implicit con-
tracts. It follows that you would see it as important to understand pre-
cisely how these norms meet the expectations of the parties. Consider
the contract analogy. If you were looking at a contract between an
employer and an employee, would you evaluate the desirability of a
specific contract term by analyzing its incentive effects, or by trying to
determine if the term made sense given the expectations of the par-
ties? The anti-positivist position seems to rule out detachment be-
cause it requires a careful examination of common-law doctrine.
I suspect that the influence of Calabresi's Costs is one of the rea-
sons anti-positivism has been in the shadows of law and economics.
Neither Becker nor Calabresi made any references to Leoni, Hayek,
or Hume in their contributions. Perhaps their examples had some
influence on Posner, who does not discuss or even cite any of the anti-
positivist literature that preceded his book. Modern generations of
scholars, raised on Becker, Calabresi, and Posner, seem to be largely
unaware of this strand of law and economics.
The one difference in this trend is represented by the new
"norms" literature.5 ° But this literature has not, so far, returned to
the original direction of the early anti-positivist law and economics
literature. The new norms literature has not attempted, as far as I am
aware, to provide a deeper understanding of the common law, or sug-
gested significant reasons to question the positivist approach common
in the modern literature.
IV. RATIONALITY IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS LITERATURE
The last topic I will consider is the role played by the rationality
assumption in law and economics and Calabresi's influence on that
role. Law and economics is often criticized, especially in the lawjour-
nals, for adhering too strongly to the rational-man model." Critics
have argued that people do not always behave as rational actors, that
50. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE Dis-
PUTES (1991); ERIuc A. POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NoRMs (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Decentral-
ized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regula-
tion of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997).
51. E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000).
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they do not carefully and accurately weigh the costs and benefits of
their anticipated actions. 2
The critique of rationality in law and economics is difficult to as-
sess and may collapse into triviality. The process of natural selection
should make some responses to external events strong enough to
overwhelm our attempts to calculate, and yet these inborn tendencies
do not prove that man is never a rational actor. Alternatively, some-
one may calculate the immediate costs and benefits of a particular
action carefully, and then after realizing that it would be costly to re-
veal to others that he had done so, lie about his motives or take an
irrational act. By his words, or perhaps by his actions, he would not
appear to be rational. Finally, some minimal degree of rationality
must be accepted even by critics of the rationality assumption. For if
men are completely or always irrational, laws are pointless.
In any event, the rational-man assumption that critics have in
mind is one of an individual who always weighs the costs and benefits
of his anticipated actions, and always takes the act with the greatest
net benefit (benefit in excess of cost). The rational actor fails to take
care when the cost of taking care is greater than the benefits he cap-
tures, or the liability he avoids, through care. The rational actor
breaches a contract whenever the benefit from breaching exceeds the
cost. The rational actor commits a crime whenever the benefit from
the criminal act exceeds the expected penalty. These benefits and
costs are typically reduced to dollars so that the rational man can
make an apples-to-apples comparison."
This version of the rational-man model is a relatively recent fea-
ture of the law and economics literature. Bentham held to a version
of the rational-man assumption. He argued that all men calculate,
even the insane.54 However, Bentham made some allowance for de-
partures from the extreme- or strong-rationality assumption. His sug-
gestions for outrageous punishments imply a belief that criminals
often did not attempt to foresee and calculate the consequences of
52. Id. at 1066-70.
53. This description of the rational actor suggests that what is really special about the
assumption is that it places severe restrictions on the actor's utility function. One could
imagine an individual who enjoys breaching contracts. His utility function should take into
account his taste for breach. Given those preferences, one could say that his tendency to
breach always, even in cases where the net monetary payoff is negative, is rational. But the
rational-actor model excludes such cases. This is a basic definitional issue that runs
throughout this paper's discussion of rationality, and the rationality debate in law and
economics generally. I am indebted to Bob Bone for bringing this to my attention.
54. JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 90 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) [hereinafter
Principles of Morals and Legislation].
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their actions, and so it was necessary to design penalties that would
attract their attention.55 For example, suppose the typical prospective
rapist does not rationally convert his expected hedonic gains and an-
ticipated punishment into a common denominator, such as dollars.
He might find these different expectations incommensurable, and
given this inability to convert gains and losses into the same terms,
may discount the losses from punishment entirely.56 A punishment
such as castration, which has the flavor of Bentham, might be superior
in its deterrent effect because the prospective rapist finds it easier to
evaluate the punishment in precisely the same terms as he evaluates
his hedonic gains.
Given his utilitarian approach, Holmes must have believed that
men were rational and would respond rationally to penalties.57 How-
ever, Holmes did not have a clear need to assume a strong form of
rationality. He was concerned with explaining the logic of the law,
not with analyzing its deterrent impact.
Becker and Calabresi represent a fork in the road in the develop-
ment of the rationality assumption in the law and economics litera-
ture. Becker presents a model in which criminals are rational actors.58
It makes sense in Becker's model, to reduce the probability of capture
to near zero and increase the fine to near infinity, because this main-
tains a high expected penalty and at the same time saves the state the
costs of frequent enforcement efforts. This is the sort of prescription
that could only come from a model that assumes a strong form of
rationality. Studies of behavior and psychology-e.g., those of B.F.
55. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 60-61 (London, Robert
Heward, 1830) (suggesting punishment of the "offending member"-e.g.-"[i]n punish-
ing the crime of forgery the hand of the offender may be transfixed by an iron instrument
fashioned like a pen"); id. at 76-93 (suggesting deformation and mutilation as possible
punishments).
56. Bentham said that in order to encourage the potential offender to take his pro-
spective penalty into account before committing an offense, a punishment should have
some "characteristic" relating it to the offense:
Punishment cannot act any farther than in as far as the idea of it, and of its
connection with the offence, is present in the mind. The idea of it, if not present,
cannot act at all .... Now, to be present, it must be remembered, and to be
remembered it must have been learnt .... When this is the case with a punish-
ment and an offence, the punishment is said to bear an analogy to, or to be charac-
teristic of, the offence.
1 BENTHAM, Principles of Morals and Legislation, supra note 54, at 92.
57. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 17, at 460-61 (describing the "bad man" and his inter-
est in how the law affects the consequences of his actions).
58. Becker, supra note 2, at 176 (assuming that "a person commits an offense if the
expected utility to him exceeds the utility that he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities").
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Skinner-suggest, contrary to Becker's model of deterrence, that peo-
ple learn best through frequent rewards or penalties in connection to
desired or undesired acts.
59
Calabresi, on the other hand, allows for less than perfect rational-
ity and the need for the state to act paternalistically at times. In partic-
ular, Calabresi describes four important deviations from the strong
form of rationality. First, people may not have enough information to
make rational decisions.6 ° Second, even if given sufficient informa-
tion, they may suffer from an optimism bias-a belief that bad things
will happen only to other people.6 1 Third, they may be judgment-
proof, so that an increase in the amount of liability in excess of their
assets has no marginal effect on their incentives for care.62 Fourth,
and most interestingly, people are likely to do poorly in comparing
short-term benefits and long-term costs-a problem Calabresi de-
scribes in terms of the Faustian bargain.6" Part of the problem may be
free-riding, or a version of the familiar Prisoner's Dilemma. Knowing
that society will not want to see me suffer in my old age, I may not save
today, expecting society to help me out when I reach poverty in my
later years. This is perfectly rational behavior at an individual level,
but irrational on an aggregate level. Another part of the problem is
time-inconsistency in preferences. Looking at his overall preferences,
Ulysses knows that he should pay no attention to the Sirens. However,
at the point at which he hears their song, he can only see clearly the
part of his preference map directly in front of him. Because our pref-
erences are dependent upon the perspective from which we view
them, we may rationally choose to take actions in the short run that
are welfare-reducing in the long run.
To be sure, both Becker and Calabresi assumed that men are ra-
tional. The difference between their approaches is in the degree of
rationality posited. Becker assumes rationality in its strongest form.
His argument that deterrence could be maintained under a program
that reduces the frequency of punishment while increasing its severity
assumed a degree of rationality that had never received support from
behavioral studies in the social sciences. Famous studies by Skinner
and others that long predated Becker's paper suggested that people
59. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HuMAN BEHAVIOR (1953).
60. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 56.
61. Id. at 56-57.
62. Id. at 58-59.
63. Id. at 57.
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do not behave as rationally as Becker's model assumed.64 Calabresi,
in contrast, assumes a weak form of rationality: that men are basically
rational subject to some pretty consistent deviations.
From this fork in the road, with Becker adopting strong-form ra-
tionality and Calabresi a weak form, the law and economics literature
seems to have taken Becker's path. Posner, whose name is virtually
synonymous with the Chicago School, adhered to Becker's approach
to rationality, and the strong-rationality assumption has since become
a defining characteristic of Chicago School law and economics.65
It should be clear that things did not need to go this way. There
is nothing special about the strong-form rationality assumption that
makes it a necessary feature of the economic analysis of law. The
scholars, largely Chicago School, who immediately followed Becker
and Calabresi could have chosen to follow Calabresi's example rather
than Becker's. If that path had been followed, there would be far less
criticism of law and economics. The behavioral law and economics
school, still in its infancy, would have been old by now.
It should also be clear that Calabresi's description of weak ration-
ality, remarkable in its clarity, anticipated the behavioral law and eco-
nomics school by a generation. The behavioral school has identified
an expanding list of deviations from strong-form rationality: over-op-
timism,66 framing effects,67 endowment effects,6" ignorance of base-
line probabilities,69 and others.7 ° The behavioral literature has
expanded, in terms of scientific capital, far beyond where it stood
64. E.g., C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957); SKINNER,
supra note 59.
65. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 1st ed., supra note 28, at I (assuming that "man is a
rational maximizer of his ends in life").
66. See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Sel-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997) (exploring the tendency "to
conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself").
67. See, e.g., JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REv. 113, 118 (1996) (studying how the framing effect, the fact that "the structure of
many choices lures people into making decisions that are suboptimal," influences decisions
in litigation).
68. See, e.g., RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECO-
NOMIC LIFE 63 (1992) (describing the endowment effect "as the fact that people often
demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it").
69. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1124 (1974) (arguing that "people rely on a limited number of
heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and predict-
ing values to simpler judgmental operations" that "sometimes ... lead to severe and sys-
tematic errors").
70. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (1993) (concluding that "exposure to the self-interest model [of
economics] . . . encourage[s] self-interested behavior"); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
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when Calabresi wrote Costs, with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
providing a significant part of that expansion.7" Still, in the end, it
appears that the behavioral school's message leaves us in the same
position that Calabresi did, viewing men as weakly rational-i.e., ra-
tional, subject to some pretty consistent deviations.
Calabresi's analysis shows that the behavioralist position is not a
critique of a deep flaw in law and economics. It is a reaction to a
particular strong-form version of rationality that emerged with Becker
and the Chicago School. Economic analysis of law can easily incorpo-
rate the behavioralist position, as we observe in Costs. The question is
whether it would be desirable, as a general matter, to incorporate the
behavioralist view in economic analysis of law.
This is partly an empirical question. Given my bias toward the
Popper-Friedman view, I would ask whether incorporation of the
behavioralists' results improves the ability of economics to either ex-
plain the law or predict its effects. I do not think that there are great
stakes connected to this issue. It is not a big question about method-
ology. It is a small question about how quickly the law and economics
analyst should reach for Occam's razor.
The other perspective on the question whether behavioral analy-
sis promises a substantial methodological change in law in economics
starts with asking why we see substantial deviations from strong-form
rationality. The most plausible explanation is that evolution has
shaped our responses to certain stimuli in ways that depart from the
rationality model. The role of evolution has not received much atten-
tion in the behavioral law and economics literature, but this may be its
area of greatest potential. An over-optimism bias, for example, may
appear to be a departure from rationality on an individual level, yet it
may be rational on an aggregate level because it imparts an evolution-
ary advantage.72 Modifying the model of rationality to take into ac-
count the ways in which natural selection may have encouraged
nonrational behavioral or thought tendencies could lead us to a bet-
ter understanding of the social desirability of some legal constraints.
There is, of course, the broader question whether men are largely
rational or largely irrational. I have not dealt with it because it is not
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) (discussing hyperbolic discounting of fu-
ture payoffs).
71. E.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 69.
72. In a competitive environment, an optimism bias could be beneficial to one group
that has to compete against another. Indeed, the inculcation of an optimism bias seems to
be a central part of what coaches aim to do with their teams. The evolutionary explanation
for an optimism bias may be similar to that for altruism.
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an issue between the rationalists and the behavioralists. Both sides
buy into the assumption that men are largely rational. And as I noted
before, if men are largely irrational, laws are pointless. Much of our
lives are built around the assumption that people behave rationally.
We assume that people will follow traffic patterns rather than simply
choose their preferred direction on any road; that they will drive over
bridges rather than jump off of them or blow them up. The difficulty
with irrationality is that there are so many ways in which it can be
expressed. If the number of irrational individuals within a society be-
comes sufficiently large, the level of public order and coordination
necessary for a functioning society collapses.
In the remainder of this Essay, I will briefly explore how Cala-
bresi's approach to rationality might have altered the treatment of two
issues: bargaining under transaction costs and discrimination.
Coasean bargaining is assumed to take place in a setting in which ra-
tional parties are fully informed as to the different allocations availa-
ble.7" If there is a possible efficient allocation, the standard rationality
model suggests that parties will reach an agreement that results in that
efficient allocation. Suppose, for example, Sam's fence is too high,
and Dave is willing to pay $100 to see it lowered. Suppose the cost to
Sam of reducing his fence is only $50. The standard rational-man
analysis suggests that Sam and Dave will reach a bargain in which Dave
agrees to pay some amount between $50 and $100 in exchange for
Sam's agreement to lower the fence.
Suppose, instead, that people are weakly rational, as suggested by
Calabresi, and suppose in particular that they would always prefer to
impose their desired outcome rather than reach the efficient outcome
through bargaining. In other words, to return to the fence example,
reaching the efficient result through bargaining is preferable to the
status quo. But Dave would much more enjoy simply imposing his
preferred result rather than bargaining. Imposing his preferred result
saves the money that would be used in Coasean bribing, and gives him
the added sense of hierarchical superiority that comes with having
someone do as he bids. This would be the type of deviation from
rationality that we might expect in a person who had difficulty com-
paring short-run gains to long-run costs. Making others do as you bid
is gratifying in the short run, but probably quite costly in the long run.
Moreover, a desire to impose your will on others, to make others
do as you bid, probably has a firm evolutionary basis. Status hierar-
73. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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chies are common in social animals.7 4 Humans are probably hard-
wired to seek actions that have a status payoff.75 Imposing your will on
others, using them as a means to your own desired ends, is perhaps
the clearest way of asserting superiority in a status hierarchy.
Now let us reconsider the standard analysis of bargaining under
transaction costs in the context of Calabresi's "spongy 
bumpers"76
hypothetical:
Suppose car-pedestrian accidents currently cost $100. Sup-
pose also that if cars had spongy bumpers the total accident
costs would only be $10. Suppose finally that spongy bump-
ers cost $50 more than the present bumpers. Assuming no
transaction costs, spongy bumpers would become established
regardless of who was held responsible for car-pedestrian ac-
cidents. If car manufacturers were held liable they would
prefer to spend $50 for the new bumpers plus $10 in acci-
dent damages, instead of $100 for accident damages. If
pedestrians were held responsible and could foresee the
costs, they would prefer to bribe car manufacturers $50 to
put in spongy bumpers and bear $10 in damages, rather than
bear $100 in damages. Exactly the same result would occur
if an arbitrary third party, e.g., television manufacturers,
were held liable initially; they too could lessen costs to them-
selves by bribing car manufacturers to put in spongy
bumpers.77
Calabresi is careful to note in his hypothetical that all parties in-
volved know the costs at issue and the technological alternatives. He
then shows that if you add transaction costs to this hypothetical, you
find that the lowest cost outcome may not result.
78 For example, it
may be too expensive for pedestrians to bribe manufacturers to install
spongy bumpers.79 One question Calabresi does not take up in this
hypothetical is why car manufacturers would not simply install the
spongy bumpers and raise the price of a car by a sufficient amount to
cover the cost. Perhaps car consumers are too uninformed to know
the value of spongy bumpers, or perhaps they would not receive a
sufficient reduction in insurance rates, or perhaps pedestrians sue so
infrequently that drivers bear too little of the costs of car-pedestrian
74. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, SociAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (rev. ed.
1957).
75. See id. at 382-83.
76. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 136.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 136-38.
79. Id. at 137.
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accidents to put significant design-reform pressure on manufacturers.
These are all potential problems with "market deterrence" (liability-
based deterrence) that Calabresi discusses in other parts of Costs.80
Let us assume that one of these is true in order to continue with the
hypothetical.
Now alter Calabresi's hypothetical slightly: assume that there are
no transaction costs and that pedestrians (and television manufactur-
ers) are not aware of the spongy bumpers alternative. Suppose, in
addition, that liability falls on pedestrians. Since spongy bumpers
would allow pedestrians to avoid $100 in losses, they clearly would be
willing to pay at least $50 to have them installed. In a Coasean bar-
gaining game, the result would be that the manufacturer reveals the
availability of spongy bumpers as a technological alternative, and
pedestrians bribe the manufacturer to have them installed. The man-
ufacturer should be willing to reveal the availability of spongy bump-
ers because he will be able to collect a bribe from pedestrians that
more than compensates for the cost of installing them.
Suppose, however, that pedestrians, as a group, are like Dave in
the fence example considered above. They would much prefer to im-
pose their desired result rather than pay for it in a Coasean bargain.
Once the manufacturer reveals the availability of spongy bumpers as a
technological alternative, the pedestrians would seek to impose it.
They might petition the legislature to have a law passed requiring
spongy bumpers on all cars. Car manufacturers, anticipating the dan-
ger, would never reveal the safer alternative.
This version of the spongy bumpers hypothetical is Williamsonian
in the sense that it involves the threat of expropriation as a type of
transaction cost.81 Indeed, one could say that transaction costs are of
three types: basic bargaining costs, i.e., the costs of meeting to bargain;
information costs, i.e., the costs associated with asymmetric information;
and opportunism costs, i.e., the costs connected to the threat of expro-
priation. The point of this discussion, however, is to show that one's
approach to rationality has important implications for the possibility
of Coasean bargaining. Calabresi's assumption of weak rationality im-
mediately introduces obstacles to Coasean bargaining, even in settings
in which basic bargaining costs are zero.
The law and economics literature on discrimination might have
developed differently if the weakly rational-man model assumed by
80. E.g., id at 78-94, 199-229.
81. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Con-
tractual Relations, 22J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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Calabresi had become the dominant approach. The economic litera-
ture on discrimination identifies two types: taste-based discrimination
and statistical discrimination.8 2 The former assumes an exogenous dis-
taste on the part of the discriminator against the target group.
83 The
latter assumes discrimination is based on statistically sound predic-
tions by the discriminator of the costs of dealing with the target
group.84 A little time reading historical material on slavery in the
United States, however, will leave you with the impression that this
model is inadequate. While taste-based and statistical discrimination
exist, both descriptions fail to capture a good deal of the discrimina-
tion actually observed.
Viewed in its historical context, racial discrimination appears to
be a belief, or set of beliefs, designed to support a status hierarchy.
Indeed, it appears that the racial discrimination observed in the
United States served, in its formative stage, to support a system of slav-
ery based on race.85 Discriminatory beliefs helped beneficiaries of
slavery directly by offering a ready moral justification for it.86 More-
over, discriminatory beliefs served the useful function of neutralizing
nonbeneficiaries who might otherwise have sought to prohibit slav-
ery.87 Since slavery was harmful to poor whites, convincing them to
accept discriminatory beliefs by giving them a sense that they had a
desirable spot in the overall status hierarchy would dampen their in-
centives to overturn the institution.
88
We can view this description of discrimination from the same per-
spective as the spongy bumper hypothetical. Since it is highly proba-
82. For a description of economic theories of discrimination, see Keith N. Hylton 
&
Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and 
the
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. LJ. 237, 247-53 (1996). The taste theory was originally
proposed by Becker. GAv S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
6-9 (1957). The
statistical theory was originally set out in papers by Edmund Phelps and Kenneth Arrow.
See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 659, 659
(1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MAR-
KETs 3, 3-33 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
83. See BECKER, supra note 82, at 8-9.
84. See Phelps, supra note 82, at 659.
85. See David Lyons, Unfinished Business: Racial Junctures in U.S. History and Their Legacy,
inJUSTICE IN TIME: RESPONDING To HISTORICAL INJUSTICE 271 (Lukas H. Meyer ed., 2004).
86. See id. at 272-79.
87. This view of the historical function of discriminatory beliefs has been stressed 
re-
cently by David Lyons. E.g., id. at 278-79. Eugene Genovese and C. Vann Woodward 
sug-
gested (though not quite as clearly as Lyons) that racism may have served a similar
function. EUGENE 0. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 22-23
(1976) (discussing the use of racism to degrade whites who associated with blacks); 
C.
VANN WoonwARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW 85-87 (2d rev. ed. 1966) (discussing
the movement to disenfranchise black voters).
88. Lyons, supra note 85, at 278-79.
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ble that the majority of southern whites were economically
disadvantaged by slavery, they had an incentive to form a coalition
that would either lessen or eliminate it. In a Coasean bargaining
game, they should have been willing to pay slaveholders to reduce the
scale of the institution, in order to eliminate its harmful external ef-
fects. On the other hand, they could choose to impose their pre-ferred result rather than bargain for it. Imposing a solution saves the
cost of Coasean bargaining, and offers the added benefit of elevating
one's perceived position in the status hierarchy.
Discrimination offers a solution, from the perspective of slave-holders, to this threat of expropriation. It offers a status payoff to the
majority of free, nonslaveholders who might otherwise form a coali-
tion in opposition to slavery. If the status payoff is sufficiently great,
they may find little incentive to impose constraints on the institution.
To return to the spongy bumper example, it is the refusal to disclose
information on the technological alternative that prevents formation
of a coalition that would impose the alternative on car manufacturers.
In the slavery case, the putting out of a piece of information-the
discriminatory belief-serves to prevent the formation of an opposing
coalition.
To return to my broader point, the two cases considered, bargain-
ing under transaction costs and discrimination, have been treated in
the law and economics literature under a rational-man model that
may be inadequate in its ability to explain real outcomes. The weakly
rational man of Calabresi's Costs probably provides better insights into
both cases. To describe him as weakly rational, however, does not sug-
gest that he is somehow less self-interested than is the rational man.
The opposite is the case. The weakly rational man is a bit more of a
brute than what we find generally assumed in the law and economics
literature.
V. CONCLUSION
Law and economics has developed through tensions among cer-
tain broad strands of thought: normative versus positive economic
analysis, positivist versus anti-positivist legal premises, and strong-form
versus weak-form rationality assumptions. Calabresi's Costs laid the
groundwork for economic analysis of law as a discipline within law
schools, and established a template for modern economic analysis oflaw that is normative, positivist, and assumes weak-form rationality. In-
deed, any modern analysis of the operational efficiency of the legal
system must borrow heavily from Calabresi. At least in part because of
the influence of Calabresi, the combination of normative economic
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analysis and legal positivism appears to have become the dominant
approach in law and economics. However, any template has the nega-
tive consequence of displacing alternative approaches. In the case of
Calabresi's Costs, the positive analysis reflected in the earlier work of
Smith and Holmes, and the anti-positivist approach of Hume, Hayek,
and Leoni were displaced. Positive economic analysis of law quickly
returned with Posner's work, but the anti-positivist literature remains
largely in the shadows. The assumption of weak rationality has only
recently begun to return to the forefront of law and economics.
